We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a … centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We find that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and … as decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to significantly lower cooperation and welfare (total pro ts). Our results …

, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of five motives: the size of gains from cooperation, expectations …

externality. A within-subjects measure of reticence to impose harm does not explain cooperation. But the externality makes … participants more pessimistic. However conditional on their beliefs participants are more, not less cooperative if cooperation …

We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a … impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical … evidence, we observe that in the starting generation cooperation is higher (lower) with a democratically chosen (rejected …

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a … centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We find that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and … as decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to significantly lower cooperation and welfare (total pro ts). Our results …

We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a … impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical … evidence, we observe that in the starting generation cooperation is higher (lower) with a democratically chosen (rejected …

punishment more strongly when the sanctioning institution is endogenously chosen. As a result, a given cooperation level can be … across the two settings as the stricter punishment implemented in the exogenous one sustains high cooperation as subjects …

punishment more strongly when the sanctioning institution is endogenously chosen. As a result, a given cooperation level can be … across the two settings as the stricter punishment implemented in the exogenous one sustains high cooperation as subjects …