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The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial alloca-tion of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419376
How do barely incentivized norms impact incentive-rich environments? We take social enterprise legislation as a case in point. It establishes rules on behalf of constituencies that have no institutionalized means of enforcing them. By relying primarily on managers' other-regarding concerns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323843
backed up by monetary incentives. We propose a novel incentive contract where - through the choice of a personal work goal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323862
When agents face coordination problems their choices often impose externalities on third parties. We investigate whether such externalities can affect equilibrium selection in a series of one-shot coordination games varying the size and the sign of the externality. We find that third-party...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323878
The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial alloca-tion of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397620
backed up by monetary incentives. We propose a novel incentive contract where - through the choice of a personal work goal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627350
How do barely incentivized norms impact incentive-rich environments? We take social enterprise legislation as a case in point. It establishes rules on behalf of constituencies that have no institutionalized means of enforcing them. By relying primarily on managers' other-regarding concerns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009706164
When agents face coordination problems their choices often impose externalities on third parties. We investigate whether such externalities can affect equilibrium selection in a series of one-shot coordination games varying the size and the sign of the externality. We find that third-party...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189325
, and the burden of proof. In this paper, we contrast a standard rational choice approach with a satisficing approach …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419382
Both in the field and in the lab, participants frequently cooperate, despite the fact that the situation can be modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner's dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323844