We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders information, for a fixed distribution of private values. In a two bidder, two value, setting, we characterize all combinations of bidder surplus and revenue that can arise, and identify the information...

A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We...

We explore a global game model of the impact of monetary policy shocks. Risk-neutral asset managers interact with risk-averse households in a market with a risky bond and a floating rate money market fund. Asset managers are averse to coming last in the ranking of short-term performance. This...

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

There is tight link between coordination and common knowledge. The role of higher order beliefs in static incomplete information games has been widely studied. In particular, information frictions breaks down common of payoffs. A large literature in economics examines dynamic coordination...

We analyze demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that the nature of the private information determines the market power of the agents and thus price and volume of equilibrium trade.We establish our results by providing a characterization of...

We study coordination games under general type spaces. We characterize rationalizable actions in terms of the properties of the belief hierarchies and show that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, defi ned as the...

We describe and contrast three different measures of an institution's credit risk. "Insolvency risk" is the conditional probability of default due to deterioration of asset quality if there is no run by short term creditors. "Total credit risk" is the unconditional probability of default, either...

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information in fluences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic...

We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out "third degree price discrimination". We...