Many democracies have public health insurance systems which combine redistribution from the rich to the poor and from the healthy to the sick. This paper shows that such systems can be in the interest of the poor and the rich from a constitutional perspective. Necessary conditions are that...

Our analysis of a game-theoretic model of liberal rights had two main purposes: First, we gave a characterization of Gibbard's solution to the liberal paradox in terms of a game equilibrium. Secondly, we asked for preference restrictions that can guarantee the existence of a Pareto-optimal...

Why is it that, in democracies, the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them? In this paper we analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful. We demonstrate that the economically powerful, i.e. the above-average...

Why is it that, in democracies, the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them? In this paper the authors analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful. They demonstrate that the economically powerful, i.e., the...

This paper deals with the relative performance of private and public employment services. For this purpose, two behavioral models are developed which take into account that private and public employment agents not only pursue different aims but also face different restrictions, in particular...

This paper provides a model for analyzing an individual's voting decision on tax amnesty and the change of his reporting behavior given amnesty is granted/rejected. Success at the polls is predicted to increase with higher penalties meted out to detected evaders while success in terms of...