We analyze the effect of different legislature size on per capita regional expenditure in Italy. According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending because logrolling and transaction costs may have canceling effects. We find a large and significantly...

This paper examines empirically the strategic interactions among central and subcentral governments when incomplete information forces the subcentral government to form expectations about the amount of transfers that it will receive from the central one. The empirical analysis features a wide...

This paper extends the empirical literature about the effects of fiscal decentralization on the growth of government along three dimensions. It distinguishes between the effects of the level of decentralization from the way local governments finance their expenditures (common pool versus own...

This presidential address assesses the crisis of the Downsian model of political competition in light of the mounting evidence on policy divergence and evaluates the possibility that the new theories of politicians’ quality and political selection provide an alternative theoretical...

The paper assesses the relative explanatory power of the Keynesian, the optimal finance, the contingent liability and several public choice theories of the determinants of public deficits on Italian 1950-1998 data. A vector error correction model suggests that deficits are sensitive to...

Tests of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance are metric sensitive and arbitrary in the evaluation of the stringency of the rules, in the aggregation of these evaluations in an index and in the imposition of a linearly specified model. We propose a nonlinear principal...

We test the "war of attrition" models of fiscal performance on the sample of Italian governments from 1948 to 1994. We control for conditioning phenomena, like government stability, majority size, central bank independence, political budget cycle and external economic constraints, as well as for...