There are two rival accounts of rational voting in the public choice tradition: the mainstream instrumental account, that sees the vote as a revelation of preference over possible electoral outcomes, essentially analogous to a market choice; and the expressive account, that sees the vote as...

Recent papers have established that bicameralism can support a nonempty core in majority voting games in two-dimensional policy spaces. The authors generalize this result to the n-dimensional case and provide a discussion of multicameralism. Bicameralism generates a core of potentially stable...

There are two rival accounts of rational voting in the public choice tradition: the mainstream instrumental account, that sees the vote as a revelation of preference over possible electoral outcomes, essentially analogous to a market choice; and the expressive account, that sees the vote as...

We construct a simple model incorporating both citizen-candidates and proportional representation and investigate its properties in a basic case with a uniform distribution of citizen ideal points and pure policy motivations, and in further cases which allow of office rents and other...

We construct models of the endogenous formation of political groups designed to capture some of the key features of political and social conflict. We draw on the `citizen candidate' approach and consider both instrumental and expressive approaches to understanding group formation and conflict...