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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999607
In G. Tullock's rent-seeking model, the probability that a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power R. The authors show that a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists when R "is greater than" 2, and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005674597
Gordon Tullock's analysis of rent seeking and overdissipation is reconsidered. The authors show that, while equilibrium strategies do not permit overdissipation in expectation, for particular realizations of players' mixed strategies the total amount spent competing for rents can exceed the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005674993