This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields a non-zero probability of...

The behavior of Bangladeshi trade unions is characterized by political activism and momentous strikes, called hartals there, have played a crucial part in most political changes in this country. We offer a theoretical framework for discussing this fact, and we test empirically its main...

A simple model of terrorism is presented where the current generation is linked to the next one by some altruism, as in standard dynastic family models. Bombing today some target increases the probability of the benefit of some public good accruing to the next generation. The model is used to...

A simple framework is set up to discuss the relationship between democracy, material welfare, and development. Democracy is regarded both as a good in its own right and as an input in the production of material welfare. The optimum level of democracy is then related to the level of development....

This paper analyzes a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the choice of the government between raising its defense expenditures or giving away some 'gifts' to his opponents as a means to defend his position in power. If the government is a Cournot-Nash player, then there is no gift in...

In this contract-theoretic model the government promises a transfer to its potential opponent in return for not engaging in a civil war. Two causes of civil war are identified: (i) imperfect credibility increases the cost of the required transfer, and may make it unfeasible; (ii) asymmetric...