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North-South climate change negotiations : a sequential game with asymmetric information
Caparrós Gass, Alejandro; Pereau, Jean-Christophe; … - In: Public choice 121 (2004) 3/4, pp. 455-480
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002506239
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Strategic ratification
Humphreys, Macartan - In: Public choice 132 (2007) 1/2, pp. 191-208
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003499190
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Involuntary defection in two-level games
Iida, Keisuke - In: Public choice 89 (1996) 3, pp. 283-303
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001211620
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Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control
Finus, Michael - In: Public choice 96 (1998) 1, pp. 145-186
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001246167
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Power-sharing negotiation and commitment in monarchies
Inata, Kana - In: Public choice 187 (2021) 3/4, pp. 501-518
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012589562
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Prosecutor plea bargaining and conviction rate structure : evidence from an experiment
Ralston, Jason; Aimone, Jason; Rentschler, Lucas; … - In: Public choice 196 (2023) 3/4, pp. 299-329
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014382567
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On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
Cardona-Coll, Daniel; Rubí-Barceló, Antoni - In: Public choice 161 (2014) 3/4, pp. 345-366
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010480148
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Bargaining and voting
Usher, Dan - In: Public choice 151 (2012) 3/4, pp. 739-755
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009515872
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Transaction costs can encourage Coasean bargaining
Robson, Alexander R. W. - In: Public choice 160 (2014) 3/4, pp. 539-549
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388647
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Legislative bargaining with costly communication
Merkel, Anna; Vanberg, Christoph - In: Public choice 183 (2020) 1/2, pp. 3-27
We investigate the effects of voting rules on delay in a multilateral bargaining experiment with costly communication. Our design is based on a variant of the Baron-Ferejohn framework. Communication takes place after a proposer is selected and before a proposal is made. In contrast to prior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012230174