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Are bureaucrats budget maximizers? : the Niskanen model and its critics
Blais, André; Dion, Stṕhane - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003578284
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Bureaucrats as public policy-makers and their self-interests
Egeberg, Morten - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003578287
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Vertical transfers and the appropriation of resources by the bureaucracy : the case of Brazilian state governments
Marconi, Nelson; Arvate, Paulo Roberto; Moura Neto, João S. - In: Public choice 141 (2009) 1/2, pp. 65-85
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003875976
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How does social trust lead to better governance? : an attempt to separate electoral and bureaucratic mechanisms
Bjørnskov, Christian - In: Public choice 144 (2010) 1/2, pp. 323-346
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008658955
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The decision to lobby bureaucrats
MacKay, Amy - In: Public choice 147 (2011) 1/2, pp. 123-138
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009154446
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Gordon Tullock’s contribution to bureaucracy
Niskanen, William A. - In: Public choice 152 (2012) 1/2, pp. 97-101
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009630377
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Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?
Brandt, Urs Steiner; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard - In: Public choice 157 (2013) 3/4, pp. 585-599
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362612
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Why do crises go to waste? : fiscal austerity and public service reform
Hugh-Jones, David - In: Public choice 158 (2013) 1/2, pp. 209-220
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365318
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State involvement in limiting textbook choice by school districts
Phillips, Michelle Andrea - In: Public choice 160 (2014) 1/2, pp. 181-203
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388748
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The political economy of tax coordination as a bargaining game between bureaucrats and politicians
Fuest, Clemens - In: Public choice 103 (2000) 3/4, pp. 357-382
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001485631