We develop a general procedure to construct pairwise meeting processes characterized by two features. First, in each period the process maximizes the number of matches in the population. Second, over time agents meet everybody else exactly once. We call this type of meetings "absolute...

We develop the theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching mechanisms. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and study the links between properties of the different mechanisms and trade frictions. A particular emphasis is placed on providing exact mappings between matching...

We propose an equilibrium refinement of strict perfect equilibrium for the finite normal form games, which is not known in the literature. Okada came up with the idea of strict perfect equilibrium by strengthening the main definition of a perfect equilibrium, due to Selten [14]. We consider the...

This paper discusses the problem of stability of equilibrium points in normal form games in the tremling-hand framework. An equilibrium point is called perffect if it is stable against at least one seqence of trembles approaching zero. A strictly perfect equilibrium point is stable against every...

The paper studies the two period incomplete markets model where assets are claims on state contingent commodity bundles and there are no bounds on portfolio trading. The important results on the existence of equilibrium in this model assume that there is a finite number of commodities traded in...

We consider properties of estimators that can be written as vector lattice (Riesz space) operations. Using techniques widely used in economic theory, we study the approximation properties of these estimators. We also provide two algorithms RIESZVAR(i-ii) for consistent parametric estimation of...