Showing 1 - 10 of 11
Experimental evidence has accumulated highlighting the limitations of formal and explicit contracts in certain situations, and has identified environments in which informal and implicit contracts are more efficient. This paper documents the superior performance of explicit over implicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540925
History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422086
We construct a laboratory market with the structure of the theoretical model of Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001). The model is a simple and natural way to represent a market in which there is a friction in the matching process between buyers and sellers. Sellers first simultaneously post prices...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786798
This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on purely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786821
Most problems with formal sector credit lending to the poor in developing countries can be attributed to the lack of information and inadequate collateral. One common feature of successful credit mechanisms is group-lending, where the loan is advanced to an individual if he/she is a part of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786822
This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein subjects play a hawk-dove game. We try to implement a correlated equilibrium with payoffs outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs by privately recommending play. We find that subjects are reluctant to follow certain recommendations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835337
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winnertake- all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531898
We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under a wide class of learning processes. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531900
Evidence shows that real-effort investments can affect bilateral bargaining outcomes. This paper investigates whether similar investments can inhibit equilibrium convergence of experimental markets. In one treatment, sellers’ relative effort affects the allocation of production costs, but a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531907
Theoretical models of information asymmetry have identied a tradeoff between the desire to learn and the desire to prevent an opponent from learning private information. This paper reports a laboratory experiment that investigates if actual bidders account for this tradeoff, using a sequential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531908