We characterise the interplay between firms' decision in product development undertaken through a research joing venture (RJV), and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. Participant firms in an RJV face a trade-off between saving the costs of product innovation by developing similar...

We characterise the interplay between firms' decisions in product development, be it joint or independent, and their ensuing repeated price behaviour, either collusive or Bertrand- Nash. Firms face a choice between participating in a joint venture inventing a single product, and in independent...

Consider a first-come first-served queue where agents arrive randomly but their participation in the queue is voluntary and strategic. This paper shows that the introduction of priority-class discrimination (retaining first-come first-serve within each class) unambiguously improves total welfare...

We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms' decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences.

We analyse optimal penal codes in both Bertrand and Cournot supergames with product differentiation. We prove that the relationship between optimal punishments and the security level (individually rational discounted profit stream) depends critically on the degree of supermodularity in the stage...

We inspect the interlink between the endogenous choice of price- and quantity- setting behavior in an oligopolic market, and cost sharing among oligopolists. A typical situation of this sort is an oligopoly game where firms invest in product development first, and ten play a marketing game...

In an oligopoly supergame, firm`s actions in prices and quantities are subject to non-negativity constraints. These aonstarints can obstruct the practicability of oprimal punishment (a la Abreu (1989), Lambson (1987), and Hacker (1996)) in sustaining tacit collusion. Noting that the prospect of...

In this paper we take a close look at those strategic incentives arising in a situation where firms share the costs and profits in a multi-firm project, and bargain for their respective (precommitted) split of cost- and profit-shares. We establish that, when each firm's effort contribution to...

Extensive literature notwithstanding, effects of the size distribution of firms on consumers' surplus and on social welfare leaves room for further exploration. In this paper we discover that size distribution imposes two counter-balancing effects on aggregate surplus of the industry : [i] even...