In this paper competition between two network firms is analysed under two alternative regulatory regimes: a global connectivity regulation (GCR) and an efficient component pricing regulation (ECPRe). Whereas a GCR imposes a full quality of reciprocal interconnection, firms will choose vertical...

In this note, we provide a multistage game form whichmay be used for managing aggressive flows which may cause network congestion or monopolisation. The mechanism here presented attains economic effciency, technical effciency and other desirable properties.

We compare two different redistributive policies specifically designed to alleviate poverty. The first one is inspired to the idea of participation income, the second focused on the introduction of a negative income tax. Briefly characterizing an economy with workers and non-workers and using...

On-line content delivery and vertical alliances between conduit and content providers are nowadays crucial issues in digital markets. In this paper, we discuss and compare a push and a pull model for on-line content delivery in the case of non-zero marginal cost for network transits because of...

Starting from Amartya Sen's works on rational behaviour, in this essay a contextually-embedded choice theory is presented. Using concepts and tools from poset mathematics, we show how to inject in rational choice theory cultural and social effects. Specifically, we define some choice...

In this paper, we study oligopolistic competition between closed and open source softwares. By intersecting existing economic contributions on open source, we propose a two stage game with perfect information and product differetiation in which producers firstly set softwares quality, then they...

In this paper, we study screening efficiency of networks as organizations in comparison with polyarchies and hierarchies. Firstly, we briefly characterize these organizational architectures, then we rank them in the case of infinitely many and finitely many decisional units. As we show and...

In this paper, we provide a very simple model to shed light on the issue of managed competition in mixed quasi-markets (i.e. regulated markets in which social and for-proÖt Örms coexist). In doing this, we consider the literature on mixed oligopolies as a reasonable reference point and try to...

We rationalize several facts emerging from the recent empirical research on cooperatives owned by workers (workers' firms, WF) as: the concern of WFs for employment; the interplay between membership and workplace safeguard within WFs; the different reaction to shocks between WFs and...