This paper studies the optimal behavior of a monopolist in the presence of asymmetric information cencerning the characteristics of the good he produces.

il lavoro tratta della determinazione della struttura di mercato prendendo in considerazione recenti modelli di oligopolio. Principalmente si focalizza sulle competizioni tecnologiche e sulla differenziazione del prodotto.

In many industries, we observe various "groups" of products linked by a common brand name. This approach to launching products extends the existing reputation, in this case the brand name, also to achieve the existing certain economies of scope in areas such as advertising costs.

In this paper we analyze horizontal mergers in mixed oligopolies. We first consider a mixed duopoly where the merger creates a monopoly, and we distinguish two cases.

This paper studies the optimal behavior of a regulator facing tho markets monopolized by two firms: one of them has bargaining power, while the other can be foced to accept any regulatory constraint, and can be thus treated as a public firm. the interaction between the strategic choices of the...

Il difficile rapporto tra istituti di credito ed imprese "industriali" è da tempo a centro di un acceso dibattito in Italia tra chi propugna, nella sostanza, un assetto di separazione proprietaria tra banche ed imprese, e chi invece vedrebbe con favore una marcata integrazione tra sistema...

Starting from a market monopolized by a two plant labour-managed (LM) firm, we consider alternative ways to reduce the inefficiencies associated with this market arrangement. The first possibility is the creation of a duopoly, in which a plant is turned into a LM firm, while the other one is...

We model a duopoly with a private and a public firm under the hypothesis of vertical product differentiation. Firms choose their quality levels first and then prices. We ask which firm will choose to serve the higher (lower) segment of the market. When firms act simultaneously in each stage,...

We show that in a mixed duopoly under quantity competition, the public firm's reaction function may be upward sloping. This is the case under concavity of the demand function when the public firm attaches private profits a smaller weight than its own profits.

In this paper we study an oligopoly game with a differentiated product using a dynamic evolutionary approach. Firms are allowed to choose between quantity setting and price setting behavior. We find that, under both classical interaction structures, namely 'random mating' and 'paying the field'....