Showing 1 - 7 of 7
The diffusion in time of a new product in a monopolistic or oligopolistic market can be described by a system of evolution equations (PDE, ODE, DDE) containing one or more control parameters (advertising, prices, plant locations, ...). The productors choose the control parameters in order to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005628756
Let us consider two new perfect substitute durable products which are produced and sold in a market by two competing firms. Looking at a potential buyer, we build a stochastic rule by which she purchases the good from one of the two firms (so that she becomes an adopter). The model is considered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005434764
In this article we propose a discrete time-based model for the evaluation of the surrender option implicit in a portfolio of single premium unit-linked life policies. We presume that the policyholders do not act rationally. Their behaviour is linked to the credibility of the insurance companies,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005434783
The paper deals with the imitation of fashion products, an issue that attracts considerable interest in practice. Copying of fashion originals is a major concern of designers and, in particular, their financial backers. Fashion firms are having a hard time fighting imitations, but legal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005265176
In this paper we propose a static model describing the commercial exploitation of a common property renewable resource by a population of agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the utility of their group while defectors maximize their own profit. Agents aren't assumed to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005628771
We model an International Environmental Agreement as a two stages game: during the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the agreement while, in the second stage, the quantity of emissions reduction is choosen. Players determine their abatement levels in a dynamic setting,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465197
A coalition is usually called stable if nobody has an immediate incentive to leave or to enter the coalition since he does not improve his payoff. This myopic behaviour does not consider further deviations which can take place after the first move. Chwe (1994) incorporated the idea of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005434771