In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information‐sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When any two agents in the network are connected either...

This paper proposes several statistical tests for finite state Markov games to ex- amine whether data from distinct markets can be pooled. We formulate homo- geneity tests of (i) the conditional choice and state transition probabilities, (ii) the steady-state distribution, and (iii) the...

Mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of our understanding of strategic situations that require decision makers to be unpredictable. Using data from nearly half a million serves over 3000 tennis matches, and data on player rankings from the ATP and WTA, we examine whether the...

This paper proposes a new approach to identification of the semiparametric multinomial choice model with fixed effects. The framework employed is the semiparametric version of the traditional multinomial logit with the fixed-effects model (Chamberlain (1980)). This semiparametric multinomial...

We consider fixed-effects binary choice models with a fixed number of periods T and regressors without a large support. If the time-varying unobserved terms are i.i.d. with known distribution F, Chamberlain (2010) shows that the common slope parameter is point identified if and only if F is...

We use a dynamic panel Tobit model with heteroskedasticity to generate forecasts for a large cross-section of short time series of censored observations. Our fully Bayesian approach allows us to flexibly estimate the cross-sectional distribution of heterogeneous coefficients and then implicitly...

This paper considers identification and estimation of the Quantile Treatment Effect on the Treated (QTT) under a straightforward distributional extension of the most commonly invoked Mean Difference in Differences Assumption used for identifying the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)....

We study a simultaneous, complete-information game played by p = 1 P agents. Each p has an ordinal decision variable Y p ∈ A p ={ 0 1 M p} , where M p can be unbounded, A p is p’s action space, and each element in A p is an action , that is, a potential value for Y p . The collective action...

This paper considers identification and estimation of the Quantile Treatment Effect on the Treated (QTT) under a straightforward distributional extension of the most commonly invoked Mean Difference in Differences Assumption used for identifying the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)....

I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a...