In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary...

We experimentally test competing theories of three-player majoritarian bargaining models with fixed, known disagreement values. Subjects are randomly assigned to three roles: a proposer and two types of voters. Each role is randomly assigned a disagreement value, i.e. a given amount of money...

This paper presents a theory of self-regulation by a firm or an industry acting collectively in the context of private and public politics. In private politics an activist identifies a social issue, makes a demand on the firm, and threatens a harmful campaign. The firm self-regulates to...

Private politics social pressure is led by social activists who use confrontational and cooperative strategies to induce firms to provide social benefits. A confrontational activist demands that a firm change its practices and threatens a harmful campaign if it does not change. A cooperative...