We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic-entry game. The fixed cost of entry is private information. Entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry. We consider general continuous distributions...

We consider a two-stage game in which firms simultaneously select prices and capacities. Then, a random number of consumers attends the market and selects a firm to visit. Consumers know all prices and quantities but not the realization of aggregate demand. The probability of being served at any...

Results from first-price, sealed-bid auctions, in which there is uncertainty regarding the number of bidders, are reported. Consistent with recent theoretical findings, concealing information regarding the number of bidders raises more revenue for the seller than revealing information....

A single monopolist plays a sequence of eight periods against a series of different entrants. There are two types of monopolists, "weak" monopolists whose single-period best response is to acquiesce after entry, and "strong" monopolists whose dominant strategy is to fight entry. Data show high...

Recent literature on joint bidding in a single-unit, common-value (CV) auction argues it enhances competition. Information pooling mitigates the adverse selection and thus elevates bidding and may even increase revenue despite the reduction in the number of bidders. I analyze joint bidding in a...