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We study how competition in nonlinear pricing between two principals (sellers) affects market participation by a privately informed agent (consumer). When participation is restricted to all or nothing (intrinsic agency), the agent must choose between both principals' contracts and selecting her...
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We characterize the optimal regulation of a firm that undertakes an environmentally risky activity. This firm (the agent) is protected by limited liability and bound by contract to a stakeholder (the principal). The level of safety care exerted by the agent is nonobservable. This level of care...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353972
What are the costs and benefits of exclusive dealing and why do manufacturers choose to organize their retailing markets in this way instead of taking a common retailer? This article traces back the benefits of this organizational form of distribution to the provision of incentives in a setting...
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We show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture. Splitting regulatory tasks and monitoring technologies among several nonbenevolent regulators may reduce their discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005732175
We discuss the internal organization of the firm, arguing that the comparison between a centralized and a decentralized hierarchical organization should be cast in terms of the agency costs associated with the different side-contracting games that agents play in these organizations. In our...
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Regulatory independence from political control enlarges the collusive opportunities between regulators and interest groups. This is costly for current politicians because deterring capture becomes harder. However, independence also constrains future governments. Whenever future and current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005551270