We analyze a dynamic second-price auction with an informed bidder and an uninformed bidder who, upon seeing a posted price, learns whether his valuation is above that price. In the essentially unique equilibrium, an informed bidder bids in the first period if her valuation is below some cutoff...

We study the information content of stock reports when investors are uncertain about a financial analyst's incentives. Incentives may be aligned, in which case the analyst wishes to credibly convey information, or incentives may be misaligned. We find the following: Any investor uncertainty...

Price dispersion is ubiquitous in settings that closely approximate textbook Bertrand competition. We show that only a little bounded rationality among sellers is needed to rationalize such dispersion. A variety of statistical tests, based on datasets from two independent laboratory experiments...

We study optimal contracting under imperfect commitment in a model with an uninformed principal and an informed agent. The principal can commit to pay the agent for his advice but retains decision-making authority. Under an optimal contract, the principal should (i) never induce the agent to...

type="main" <p>A firm surveys a large number of consumers, some of whom sincerely report their tastes and others of whom report strategically. It makes product decisions using the sample mean of survey responses. When firms and consumers agree on the fraction of sincere consumers, information loss...</p>