We provide a political-economy analysis of crime prevention in an arbitrary city in the United States. City residents (voters) elect mayors (politicians) and elected mayors determine the resources to be allocated to crime prevention. Between the two time periods, there is an election....

In this note, we focus on the decision problem faced by a city authority (CA) who seeks to attract members of the creative class to her city by providing a local public good (LPG). We construct a stylized model of this interaction and shed light on three questions. First, we determine the...

A lacuna in the extant literature and our desire to contribute to the theoretical literature on how tax/subsidy policies can be used by regions to attract the creative class together provide the motivation for this paper. The paper’s basic contribution is that it is the first to theoretically...

We study the decision problem faced by a city authority (CA) who seeks to attract members of the creative class to his city by providing amenities. Creative class members care about their own incomes and about the amenities that the city provides. We construct a stylized model of this...

We provide the first theoretical analysis of the effects of alternate forms of taxation on economic growth in a dynamic model with multiple regions. The regions are heterogeneous but, in each region, consumers have constant relative risk aversion preferences, there is no growth in the stock of...

We study the decision problems faced by a city authority (CA) who focuses on two different objectives in her attempt to attract members of the creative class to her city by providing a local public good (LPG). First, we compute the maximum tax that a creative class member is willing to pay to...

In this introductory chapter, we contextualize and briefly describe the intellectual contributions of the different chapters in this book. Following this chapter, which comprises Part I of the book, there are eleven chapters and each of these chapters addresses a particular research question or...

We study interregional competition for mobile creative capital between regions A and B. Regional authorities (RAs) in both regions use tax policy to attract the creative capital possessing members of the creative class to their region. The resulting tax revenues help RAs finance other objectives...

We focus on an aggregate economy of two nearby cities A and B and study whether it is possible for the leviathan governments in these two cities to use taxes τA and τB to attract members of the so-called creative class. The creative class population is fixed and members locate either in city A...

We study some measurement issues that arise when analyzing the long run behavior of the jth creative region's time t log output per creative class member (y_j(t)) when this region is part of an aggregate economy of j = 1, …, N creative regions. We focus first (second) on absolute (relative)...