The purpose of this paper is to investigate the mutual compatibility of voluntary provision of public good and strategic behavior of consumers in the market for private goods. We study the existence of equilibrium private provision of a public good within general strategic equilibrium framework...

The adoption of a common central Bank has modified the strategic relationships between fiscal and monetary authorities and raised in a new context the issue of debt stabilization. To study this problem, Van Aarle et al (1997) have proposed a two-country model with a common central bank. In a...

This paper introduces two equilibrium concepts which extend the notion of Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmarks of Cournot-Walras economies and of strategic market games, the introduction of an active leader modifies the working of market power and...

The impact of private benefits extraction on the values of oligopolistic firms is analyzed. Private benefits are assumed to generate costs which are passed through the organizational structure and create price distortion in the downstream product market. We prove that this may affect the profit...

In this paper, we reconstruct the main developments of the theory of noncooperative oligopoly in general equilibrium, by focusing on the analysis of three prototypical models for pure exchange economies: the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991); the model of...

In this paper, we reconsider two models of noncooperative oligopoly in general equilibrium proposed by Busetto et al. ((2008), (2011)): a version of the Shapley?s window model for mixed exchange economies à la Shitovitz and its reformulation à la Cournot-Walras. We introduce the assumption...

In this paper we study the Nash equilibrium in a smooth public goods economy, described as a non-cooperative game, where the set of players is a mixed measure space of consumers. We assume a finite number of private goods. We show that under certain conditions there exists a unique Nash...