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Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem
Rene, Saran; Norovsambuu, Tumennasan - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2011
The mechanism used in Nash implementation is a form of direct democracy, taking everyone''s opinion into account. We augment this mechanism with a political process that selects the opinions of a subset of the individuals. We study three such processes -- oligarchy, oligarchic democracy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008922421
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Sorting on Skills and Preferences: Tinbergen Meets Sattinger
Arnaud, Dupuy - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2011
identification of compensating wage differentials and nonadditive marginal utility functions using observations from a single hedonic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008922426
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Communication network formation with link specificity and value transferability
Harmsen-van Hout Marjolein J.W.; Jean-Jacques, Herings P.; … - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2011
We propose a model on strategic formation of communication networks with (i) link specificity: the more direct links somebody maintains, the less she can specify her attention per link, the lower her links’ value, while this negative externality was previously ignored in the communication...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008922427
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Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities
Abhimanyu, Khan; Ronald, Peeters - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2011
We study duopolistic competition in a differentiated market with firms setting prices and quantities, without explicitly imposing market clearing. Unlike the commonly adopted assumption of profit maximizing firms, we assume firm behavior to be shaped by a Darwinian dynamic: the less fitter firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003396
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Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games
Arno, Riedl; Rohde Ingrid M.T.; Martin, Strobel - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2011
Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly theinability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. Wehypothesize that people will be able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they havesufficient freedom...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391886
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Path-Monotonicity and Incentive Compatibility
André, Berger; Rudolf, Müller; Hossein, Naeemi Seyed - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2010
We study the role of monotonicity in the characterization of incentive compatible allocation rules when types are multi-dimensional, the mechanism designer may use monetary transfers, and agents have quasi-linear preferences over outcomes and transfers. It is well-known that monotonicity of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642577
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A strategic approach to estate division problems with non-homogenous preferences
Dénes, Pálvölgyi; Hans, Peters; Dries, Vermeulen - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2010
The classical bankruptcy problem (O''Neill, 1982) is extended by assuming that the agents have non-homogenous preferences over several estates. A special case is the one in which there are finitely many estates and the agents have homogenous preferences, i.e., constant utilities, per estate. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642578
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Strategic Party Formation on a Circle
Ronald, Peeters; Rene, Saran; Muge, Yuksel Ayse - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2010
We study a spatial model of party formation in which the set of agendas is the unit circle. We characterize the sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria under the plurality and proportional rules. In both rules, multiple configurations of parties are possible in Nash equilibrium. We refine our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646235
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Theory of the Firm: Bargaining and Competitive Equilibrium
Volker, Britz; Jean-Jacques, Herings; Arkadi, Predtetchinski - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2010
firm''s production plan and a scheme of transfers which are payable before the uncertainty about the future state of nature …. Given the distribution of bargaining power, we obtain a unique prediction for a production plan and a transfer scheme. When … markets are complete, the production plan chosen corresponds to the profit-maximizing production plan as in the Arrow …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727356
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Optimal Value Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining
Volker, Britz - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2010
probabilities.Instantaneous utility is linear, but players discount the future bya constant factor. Before bargaining starts, a … level of utility, then the commitmentbecomes void. Intuitively, this simply means that no player canremain committed to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727357