The Global Newton Method for games in normal form and in extensive form is shown to have a natural extension to computing Markov-perfect equilibria of stochastic games.

For an all-pay sealed-bid auction of an item for which each bidder's realized value can depend on every bidder's privately observed signal, existence of equilibria in behavioral strategies is established using only the assumption that bidders' value functions and the density function of signals...

A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. Such an equilibrium has...

For two symmetric bidders, weak monotonicity conditions are shown to imply existence of an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies for a sealed-bid first-price auction of an item for which each bidder's value depends on every bidder's observed signal. Such an equilibrium has atomless...

We apply three axioms adapted from decision theory to refinements of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall that select connected closed sub- sets called solutions. No player uses a weakly dominated strategy in an equilibrium in a solution. Each solution contains a quasi-perfect...

Three axioms from decision theory are applied to refinements that select connected subsets of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall. The first axiom requires all equilibria in a selected subset to be admissible, i.e. each player's strategy is an admissible optimal reply to other...

We apply Mertens' dedinition of stability for a game in strategic form to a game in extensive form with perfect recall. We prove that if payoffs are generic then the outcomes of stable sets of equilibria defined via homological essentiality by Mertens coincide with those defined via homotopic...

We define a refinement of Nash equilibria called metastability. This refinement supposes that the given game might be embedded within any global game that leaves its local bestreply correspondence unaffected. A selected set of equilibria is metastable if it is robust against perturbations of...

A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive form with perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the strategy is an optimal reply at every information set it does not exclude. The outcome satisfies forward...

Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies (admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and dependence only on the game's normal form even...