Traditional liquidity measures can provide a false impression of the liquidity and stability of financial market trading. Using data on auctions (bids wanted in competition; BWICs) from the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) market, we show that a standard measure of liquidity, the effective...

We examine the network of trading relations between insurers and dealers in the over-the-counter corporate bond market. Comprehensive regulatory data shows that many insurers use only one dealer while the largest insurers have networks of up to forty dealers. Large insurers receive better prices...

This paper combines daily non-public data on buy and sell volume by institutions from 2003 through 2005 for NYSE-listed stocks with all news announcements from Reuters. Natural language processing categorizes the sentiment associated with each news story. We use institutional order flow (buy...

How much of a loan should a lender dynamically retain and how does retention affect loan performance? We address these questions in a dynamic agency model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and...

We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce short- and long-term investment levels beyond first best, leading to short- or...

We develop a model in which a startup firm issues tokens to finance a digital platform, which creates agency conflicts between platform developers and outsiders. We show that token financing is generally preferred to equity financing, unless the platform expects strong cash flows or faces severe...