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Executive compensation and stock options : an inconvenient truth
Danthine, Jean-Pierre; Donaldson, John B. - 2008
to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many high-proffile managers' compensation is in the form of various …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003961700
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Move a little closer? : information sharing and the spatial clustering of bank branches
Qi, Shusen; Haas, Ralph de; Ongena, Steven; Straetmans, … - 2018 - This version: 27 February 2018
We study how information sharing between banks influences the geographical clustering of branches. A spatial oligopoly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011875705
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Portfolio delegation and market efficiency
Malamud, Semyon; Petrov, Evgeny - 2014
managers and convex compensation contracts. We show that convex incentives lead to significant equilibrium mispricing, but … strong or too weak and hurt investors as a whole. For example, investors' utility may be decreasing in the average managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337960
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Dynamic principal-agent models
Renner, Philipp; Schmedders, Karl - 2016
We consider discrete time dynamic principal--agent problems with continuous choice sets and potentially multiple agents. We prove the existence of a unique solution for the principal's value function only assuming continuity of the functions and compactness of the choice sets. We do this by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011516045
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New and revised results for "Building reputation for contract renewal: implications for performance dynamics and contract duration"
Kummer, Vanessa; Meusel, Maik; Renner, Philipp; … - 2016
In this paper we present some new results for the dynamic agent model by Iossa and Rey (2014, "Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration,'' Journal of the European Economic Association, 12, 549−574) while also correcting some errors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011518748
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Director independence as strategic behavior
Wagner, Alexander F. (contributor) - 2007
This paper analyzes board independence and competence as distinct, but inextricably linked aspects of board effectiveness. Competent directors add shareholder value because they have better information about the quality of projects. While a CEO cares about shareholder value, he also wants his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003550804
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Executive compensation : the view from general equilibrium
Danthine, Jean-Pierre (contributor);  … - 2007
firm to risk averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component corresponding to a non … and that maximizing the discounted sum of future dividends will be her objective. Linking managers' compensation to … overall economic performance is also required to make sure that managers use the appropriate stochastic discount factor to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003550864
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Investing in managerial honesty
Gibson, Rajna; Sohn, Matthias; Tanner, Carmen; Wagner, … - 2017
This paper studies how investors infer CEO commitment to honesty from earnings management and how these perceptions – in conjunction with investors’ own social and moral preferences – shape their investment choices. We conduct two laboratory experiments simulating investment choices. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626498
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Bank bonus pay as a risk sharing contract
Efing, Matthias; Hau, Harald; Kampkötter, Patrick; … - 2018
We argue that risk sharing motivates the bank-wide structure of bonus pay. In the presence of financial frictions that make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk sharing whereby bonus pay partially absorbs earnings shocks....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011938641
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Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger; Stulz, René M. - 2009
We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003970468