Why do investors keep buying underperforming mutual funds? To address this issue, we develop a one-period principal-agent model with a representative investor and a fund manager in an asymmetric information framework. This model shows that the investors perception of the fund plays the key role...

We develop a dynamic model to study the interaction between obfuscation and investor sophistication in retail financial markets. Taking into account different learning mechanisms within the investor population, we characterize the optimal timing of obfuscation for a profit-maximizing monopolist....

We show that mutual funds compete for climate-conscious investment flows. In April 2018, Morningstar introduced a climate-focused label for mutual funds. The release of the "Low Carbon Designation" induced reactions on both the demand and supply sides of the market. First, investors flocked to...

This note illustrates a simple but important insight for financial investment. In a heterogeneous agent-based evolutionary finance market model with long-lived assets, markets are stable if clients of fundamental ('value') investment funds are more patient than clients of other funds

In this paper we present a two period model, where the agent's preferences are described by prospect theory as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky. We solve for the agent's portfolio decision. Our findings are that the changes in portfolio weights depend crucially on the reference point and the...

Repo markets trade off the efficient allocation of liquidity in the financial sector with resilience to funding shocks. The repo trading and clearing mechanisms are crucial determinants of the allocation-resilience tradeoff. The two common mechanisms, anonymous central-counterparty (CCP) and...

We develop a principal-agent model based on a sequential game played by a representative investor and a fund manager in an asymmetric information framework. The model shows that investors' perceptions of the fund market play the key role in the fund's fee-setting mechanism. The managers' true...

Some investment advisors offer multiple versions of a fund with the same manager and highly correlated returns. But these twinʺ funds are separate portfolios for different investors with differing abilities to select and monitor managers. Using a matched sample of retail and institutional twin...

This paper establishes a new empirical fact: mutual funds' flow-performance sensitivity is a hump-shaped function of aggregate risk-factor realizations. Explanations based on extant theories can only explain a fraction of the pattern. We thus develop a new parsimonious model. It assumes Bayesian...

The interplay between investors' demand and providers' incentives has shaped the evolution of exchange-traded funds (ETFs). While early ETFs offered diversification at low cost, later ETFs track niche portfolios and charge high fees. Strikingly, over their first five years, specialized ETFs lose...