The optimal investment-dividend policy of a financially constrained firm whose earnings are subject to additive shocks is shown to exhibit several stylized economic and financial features of the firm life cycle which usually require considerably more complex models. This parsimonious model...

Using a dynamic model of financing, investment, and macroeconomic risk, we investigate when firms sell assets to fund investments (financing asset sales) across the business cycle. Equity financed investment transfers wealth from equity to debt because asset volatility declines and earnings...

We solve the problem of optimal inventory management for a CARA market-maker who faces proportional transaction costs and marking to market. Our model accommodates inventory shocks following an arbitrary compound Poisson process, and allows us to link the optimal policy to the moment-generating...

When investors have incomplete information, expected returns, as measured by an econometrician, deviate from those predicted by standard asset pricing models by including a term that is the product of the stock's idiosyncratic volatility and the investors' aggregated forecast errors. If...

We quantify the impact of merger activity on productive efficiency. We develop and calibrate a dynamic industry-equilibrium model that features mergers, entry, and exit by heterogeneous firms. Mergers affect productivity directly through realized synergies, and indirectly through firms'...

This paper analyzes board independence and competence as distinct, but inextricably linked aspects of board effectiveness. Competent directors add shareholder value because they have better information about the quality of projects. While a CEO cares about shareholder value, he also wants his...

Active fund managers implicitly promise to research profitable portfolio selection. But active management is an experience good subject to moral hazard. Investors cannot tell high from low quality up front and therefore fear manager shirking. We show how the parties mitigate the moral hazard by...

In this paper we present some new results for the dynamic agent model by Iossa and Rey (2014, "Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration,'' Journal of the European Economic Association, 12, 549−574) while also correcting some errors...

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager-shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. Using panel data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we show that while refinancing costs help explain the...

We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence...