Andrikogiannopoulou and Papakonstantinou (AP; 2019) conduct an inquiry into the bias of the False Discovery Rate (FDR) estimators of Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (BSW; 2010). In this Reply, we replicate their results, then further explore the bias issue by (i) using different parameter values,...

This paper analyzes competition between mutual funds in a multiple funds version of the model of Hugonnier and Kaniel. We characterize the set of equilibria for this delegated portfolio management game and show that there exists a unique Pareto optimal equilibrium. The main result of this paper...

We develop a principal-agent model based on a sequential game played by a representative investor and a fund manager in an asymmetric information framework. The model shows that investors' perceptions of the fund market play the key role in the fund's fee-setting mechanism. The managers' true...

We document a curious feature of the German mutual fund industry. Unlike U.S. mutual funds, funds domiciled in Germany do not necessarily compute their net asset values (NAV) as of market close. Using a sample of German equity funds, we infer each fund's NAV closing time from the best-fit market...

This paper proposes a model of asset-market equilibrium with portfolio delegation and optimal fee contracts. Fund managers and investors strategically interact to determine funds' investment profiles, while they share portfolio risk through fee contracts. In equilibrium, their investment...

This paper establishes a new empirical fact: mutual funds' flow-performance sensitivity is a hump-shaped function of aggregate risk-factor realizations. Explanations based on extant theories can only explain a fraction of the pattern. We thus develop a new parsimonious model. It assumes Bayesian...

Mutual funds are mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to disclose information on their investment objectives and risks. In this paper, we study the informational value of U.S. mutual funds' qualitative disclosures by analyzing the content of funds' prospectuses. First, we...