We study how banks react to policy announcements during the representative policy cycle of consultation and policy publication. We use unique data covering the population of all mortgage transactions in the UK complemented with regulatory risk assessments of banks and their supervisory...

In spite of growing regulatory pressure in most developed economies, “zombie lending” remains a widespread practice by banks. In this paper we exploit a series of large-scale on-site inspections made on the credit portfolios of several Portuguese banks to investigate how these inspections...

We investigate the compensation of counterparty exposure in the prices of structured products. Our analysis reveals that product issuers do not compensate retail investors for counterparty exposure before the Lehman default. Post-Lehman, retail prices no longer neglect this risk. We also measure...

We identify the effects of negative interest rate policies on bank behavior using difference-in differences identification and data on all Swiss banks. First, we find that going negative can interrupt not only the pass-through from policy to deposit rates, but also that to mortgage rates....

The internal ratings-based (IRB) approach maps banks’ risk profiles more adequately than the standardized approach. After switching to IRB, banks’ risk-weighted asset (RWA) densities are thus expected to diverge, especially across countries with different supervisory strictness and risk...

This paper provides evidence on how the new international regulation on Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) impacts the market value of large banks. We analyze the stock price reactions for the 300 largest banks from 52 countries across 12 relevant regulatory announcement and...

We investigate the risk taking incentives of "stressed banks" - the banks that are subject to annual regulatory stress tests in the U.S. since 2011. We document that stress tests effectively encourage prudent investment from stressed banks through regulatory monitoring, but also provide them...

We study how supranational capital regulation incentivizes national authorities to exercise forbearance and how this affects the regulatory capital of banks across countries. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels...

To ensure that central counterparties (“CCPs”) are safe in all market conditions the European Union (EU) has adopted legislation, commonly known as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”) that deals with their organisational requirements, including prudential requirements...