Systemic risk may be defined as the propensity of a financial institution to be undercapitalized when the financial system as a whole is undercapitalized. In this paper, we investigate the case of non-U.S. institutions, with several factors explaining the dynamics of financial firms returns and...

Following the 2008 financial crisis, regulation mandates the clearing of the CDS market through Central Clearing Counter-parties (CCPs). Large CCPs are now designated as 'Global Systemically Important Institutions' (GSIIs), whose unlikely-but-plausible failure threatens global financial market...

Recently, for standard asset classes, the first mutual clearing agreements between Central Coun- terparties (CCPs) have come into existence. There are already global concerns over the unique threats and benefits which arise from these situations, and further concern for an extension of agree-...

Recent regulation mandating the clearing of credit default swaps (CDS) by a Central Clearing Counterparties (CCP), has rendered the latter a systemically important institution, whose failure poses a serious threat to global financial stability. This work investigates the potential failure of a...

This paper provides evidence on how the new international regulation on Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) impacts the market value of large banks. We analyze the stock price reactions for the 300 largest banks from 52 countries across 12 relevant regulatory announcement and...

We derive closed form expressions for equilibrium asset prices and liquidity in an economy populated by a finite number of large, strategic, risk averse investors. The model allows for arbitrary risk preferences, any number of assets, and an arbitrary distribution of asset payoffs. In...

We argue that incentives to take equity risk ("equity incentives") only partially capture incentives to take asset risk ("asset incentives"). This is because leverage, while central to the theory of risk shifting, is not explicitly considered by equity incentives. Employing measures of asset...

We study bailouts of banks that suffer from debt overhang problems and have private information about the quality of their assets-in-place and new investment opportunities. Menus of bailout plans are used as a screening device. Constrained-optimality involves over capitalization and nonlinear...

Regulators charged with monitoring systemic risk need to focus on sentiment as well as narrowly defined measures of systemic risk. This chapter describes techniques for jointly monitoring the co-evolution of sentiment and systemic risk. To measure systemic risk, we use Marginal Expected...

In this paper, we examine the relationship between banks lobbying activities, their size, financial strength, and sources of income. First, we find that banks are more likely to lobby when they are larger, have more vulnerable balance sheets, are less creditworthy, and have more diversified...