This paper examines short sales transaction volumes on the first trading day of 610 initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2011 to 2015. The tests provide evidence of informed trading immediately at the IPO. Results reveal that short selling volume on the first trading day of the IPO is...

In this paper, I estimate the effect of mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions disclosure on corporate value. Using the introduction of mandatory GHG emissions reporting for firms listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange as a source of exogenous variation, I find that firms most...

We investigate how board overlap affects coordination and performance among public firms. Our identification exploits the staggered introduction of Corporate OpportunityWaivers (COWs) in nine U.S. states since 2000. By reducing legal risk to directors serving on multiple boards, the COW...

This paper investigates the extent to which voluntary disclosure quality (VDQ) of firms is reflected in equity prices. As a novel contribution, we explore the idea that the speed with which equity prices reflect any benefits or costs of VDQ varies across firms. We find that in environments where...

Polytope Fraud Theory (PFT) extends the existing triangle and diamond theories of accounting fraud with ten abnormal financial practice alarms that a fraudulent firm might trigger. These warning signals are identified through evaluation of the shorting behavior of sophisticated activist short...

This paper studies how investors infer CEO commitment to honesty from earnings management and how these perceptions – in conjunction with investors’ own social and moral preferences – shape their investment choices. We conduct two laboratory experiments simulating investment choices. Our...

We find that investors are fixated on analysts' consensus outputs (earnings forecasts, recommendations, and forecast dispersion), which can be inferior signals compared to the corresponding outputs provided by high-quality analysts, especially when a large number of high-quality analysts follow...

This paper studies the earnings management behavior of a manager in a strategic game in which the manager may have incentives to avoid earnings below the analysts' consensus forecast and the analysts aiming to provide accurate forecasts behave as rational Bayesians. Our analysis reveals the...

Does earnings management, even though legal, hinder investor trust in reported earnings? Or do investors regard earnings management as a way for firms to convey private information, or simply as a neutral feature of financial reporting? We find that past abstinence from earnings management...

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager-shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. Using panel data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we show that while refinancing costs help explain the...