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On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - In: Review of Economic Design 14 (2010) 1, pp. 17-25

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008624672

Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale

Tian, Guoqiang - In: Review of Economic Design 14 (2010) 1, pp. 163-184

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008624678

Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - In: Review of Economic Design 26 (2021) 4, pp. 635-649

implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand … provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014497503

To merge or not to merge: That is the question

Corchón, Luis; Fauli-Oller, Ramon - In: Review of Economic Design 9 (2004) 1, pp. 11-30

In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about all … parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We show that implementation requires a certain degree …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753044

Implementation of competitive nonlinear pricing: tariffs with inclusive consumption

Jensen, Sissel - In: Review of Economic Design 10 (2006) 1, pp. 9-29

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753070

Implementing the nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems

Conley, John; Wilkie, Simon - In: Review of Economic Design 1 (1994) 1, pp. 205-216

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753111

original papers : Constitutional implementation

Winter, Eyal; Peleg, Bezalel - In: Review of Economic Design 7 (2002) 2, pp. 187-204

We consider the problem of implementing a social choice correspondence H in Nash equilibrium when the constitution of the society is given by an effectivity function E. It is assumed that the effectivity function of $ H,E^{H}$, is a sub-correspondence of E. We found necessary and efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596590

original papers : Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality

Naegelen, Florence - In: Review of Economic Design 7 (2002) 2, pp. 135-153

In this paper, we consider the implementation of the optimal procurement auction outcome when there is a trade …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596592

original papers : Implementation with partial verification

Singh, Nirvikar; Wittman, Donald - In: Review of Economic Design 6 (2001) 1, pp. 63-84

condition, which suggest that it may be too restrictive. This leads us to consider implementation (not necessarily truthful) in … mechanism designer further leeway. We show how partial verification may allow efficient implementation of bilateral trade, where …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178678

Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

Trockel, Walter - In: Review of Economic Design 7 (2002) 1, pp. 27-43

suitable game in strategic form can be used to derive the mechanism theoretic Nash-implementation of that solution. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178679