The stochastic evolution of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms. We show that several effects are at work. The state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater. Since joint payoffs are related to joint product-market profits less joint effort...

The paper presents two models of races in which there is both technological uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors. The authors' aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them. In the principal model, which is of a...

We show how the willingness-to-pay problem and lack of exclusivity in sovereign lending may result in an equilibrium sovereign debt structure that is excessively difficult to restructure. A bankruptcy regime for sovereigns can alleviate this inefficiency but only if it is endowed with...

This paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings. Its main fo cus is on supply assurance concerns that arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply. Integration reduce s supply assurance concerns for an...

The authors analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth and a wealthy investor. Both agents have potentially conflicting objectives, the entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns from the project while the investor is...

We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the sense that they face time costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable...

We propose a model of costly decision making based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision-maker's thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time, and lets the decision maker 'think ahead' about future decision problems in yet...

We present a multiperiod agency model of stock-based executive compensation in a speculative stock market, where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and stock prices may deviate from underlying fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This component arises from the option to...