Suppose that a seller and a buyer have private valuations for a good and that their respective utilities from a trading mechanism are given by u(subscript 's') and u(subscript 'b'). Consider the problem of maximizing E[('lambda')u(subscript 's') + (1 - 'lambda')u(subscript 'b')] for some weight...

This paper analyzes duopolistic price-leadership games in which firms have capacity constraints. The authors show that when capacities are in the range where the simultaneous-move price-setting game (with efficiently rationed demand) yields a mixed-strategy solution the large firm is indifferent...

This article reconsiders the durable goods monopoly problem when the monopolist's marginal cost is private information. The authors show that the Coase conjecture implies the no trade theorem: in any equilibrium in which the lowest-cost seller's initial offer approaches her marginal cost, the...