Speculators buy an asset hoping to sell it later to investors with higher private valuations. If agents are uncertain about the distribution of private valuations and about the beliefs of others about this distribution, a beauty contest with an infinite hierarchy of beliefs arises. Under...

We analyse the optimal Initial Public Offering (IPO) mechanism in a multidimensional adverse selection setting where institutional investors have private information about the market valuation of the shares, the intermediary has private information about the demand, and the institutional...

We analyse the optimal Initial Public Offering (IPO) mechanism in a multidimensional adverse selection setting where institutional investors have private information about the market valuation of the shares, the intermediary has private information about the demand, and the institutional...

Procedures are presented that allow the empiricist to estimate and test asset pricing models on limited-liability securities without the assumption that thehistorical payoff distribution provides a consistent estimate of the market's priorbeliefs. The procedures effectively filter return data...

Procedures are presented that allow the empiricist to estimate and test asset pricing models on limited-liability securities without the assumption that the historical payoff distribution provides a consistent estimate of the market's prior beliefs. The procedures effectively filter return data...

Information collection and processing in financial institutions is challenging. This can delay the observation by traders of the exact capital charges and constraints of their institution. During this delay, traders face preference uncertainty. In this context, we study optimal trading...

We study how securities and issuance mechanisms can be designed to mitigate the adverse impact of market imperfections on liquidity. In our model, asset owners seek to obtain liquidity by selling claims contingent on privately observed future cash-flows. Liquidity suppliers can be competitive or...

An entrepreneur with limited liability needs to finance an infinite horizon investment project. An agency problem arises because she can divert operating cash flows before reporting them to the financiers. We first study the optimal contract in discrete time. This contract can be implemented by...

An entrepreneur with limited liability needs to finance an infinite horizon investment project. An agency problem arises because she can divert operating cash flows before reporting them to the financiers. We first study the optimal contract in discrete time. This contract can be implemented by...

We study how securities and issuance mechanisms can be designed to mitigate the adverse impact of market imperfections on liquidity. In our model, asset owners seek to obtain liquidity by selling claims contingent on privately observed future cash-flows. Liquidity suppliers can be competitive or...