We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="bib15">Grossman and Hart (1980)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="bib17">Harris and Raviv (1988)</xref>, and Blair, Golbe and Gerard (1989). We consider three...

We consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer's need. In our model, experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions. We explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices...

We consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer's need. In our model, experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions. We explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices...

The model features a dynamic market in steady state in which prices ar e determined in first-price auctions. It combines competition over ti me, familiar from the pairwise meeting models, with instantaneous bid ding competition. It inquires how different properties of the model d etermine the...

For a market with a finite number of agents, pairwise matching, and bargaining, it is shown that, even when the market is frictionless, the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive. It depends on the amount of information agents use. If their behavior is conditioned only on the sets of agents...

We propose a method to test a prediction of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian, non-parametric setting, a predicted distribution is tested using a realization of the stochastic process. A test associates a set of realizations for each predicted distribution, on which the...

We endogenize preferences using the “indirect evolutionary approach”. Individuals are randomly matched to play a two-person game. Individual (subjective) preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual (objective) pay-offs that determine fitness. Matched individuals may...

"My own behaviour baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe." Saint PaulWhat behaviour can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a "standard rational agent"? In earlier work, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R8">Gul and Pesendorfer...</xref>