Showing 1 - 10 of 13
The revenue-equivalence theorm for auctions predicts that expected seller revenue is independent of the bidding rules, as long as equilibrium has the properties that the buyer with the highest reservation price wins and any buyer with the lowest possible reservation price has zero expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005242599
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005242633
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005242748
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005251070
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005251265
We model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology (here consisting of a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him. We argue that different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005167939
The authors scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature. This literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing--or of even foreseeing--the possible states of nature in advance. They argue,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168054
The authors first point out that the recent property-rights literature is based on three assumptions: (1) that contracts are always subject to renegotiation; (2) that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and (3) that parties are risk-neutral. Building on Hart-Moore (1999),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168076
If is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of 'welfare optima.' A game form (or 'mechanism') implements the social choice rule if, for any potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168090
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168224