We study an infinitely repeated first-price auction with common values. We focus on one-sided incomplete information, in which one bidder learns the objects' value, which itself does not change over time. Learning by the uninformed bidder occurs only through observation of the bids. The...

This paper presents a model of dynamic competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative activity. The state of competition—measured by the difference between the number of innovations introduced by the firms—evolves stochastically according to their effort level. The...

This paper analyses a dynamic auction in which a fraction of each bid is sunk. Jump bidding is used by bidders to signal their private information. Bluffing (respectively sandbagging) occurs when a weak (respectively strong) player seeks to deceive his opponent into thinking that he is strong...

We study an infinitely repeated first-price auction with common values. We focus on one-sided incomplete information, in which one bidder learns the objects' value, which itself does not change over time. Learning by the uninformed bidder occurs only through observation of the bids. The...

This paper presents a model of dynamic competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative activity. The state of competition-measured by the difference between the number of innovations introduced by the firms-evolves stochastically according to their effort level. The...

Another issue related to bidding strategy is whether to be bold or cautious in opening bidding. The man who strongly desires an item will jump in with both feet, as it were, or try to rout the enemy by starting out with a high, possibly loud, bid intended to "knock out" his opponents. Sometimes...