In this paper we first explore the impact of nominal and real persistence on the transmission process of various shocks in an estimated DSGE model of euro area. We then analyse its impact on optimal monetary policy and investigate the performance of various monetary policies when the policy...

Monetary policy communication is particularly important during unconventional times, because high uncertainty about the economy, the introduction of new policy tools and possible limits to the central bank 's toolkit could hamper the predictability of policy actions. We study how monetary policy...

We use scenario analysis to assess the macroeconomic effects of carbon transition policies aimed at mitigating climate change. To this end, we employ a version of the ECB's New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) augmented with a framework of disaggregated energy production and use, which distinguishes...

This paper investigates the performance of optimised interest rate rules when there is uncertainty about a key determinant of the monetary transmission mechanism, namely the degree of persistence characterising the inflation process. The paper focuses on the euro area and utilises two variants of...

We use a version of the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) developed at the ECB in order to quantify the gains from monetary policy cooperation. The model is calibrated in order to match a set of empirical moments. We then derive the cooperative and (open-loop) Nash monetary policies, assuming that the...

This paper provides a detailed description of an extended version of the ECB's New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) of the euro area (cf. Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne 2008). The extended model - called NAWM II - incorporates a rich financial sector with the threefold aim of (i) accounting for a genuine...

This paper examines monetary policy implementation in a sticky price model. The central bank's plan under discretionary optimization is entirely forward-looking and exhibits multiple equilibrium solutions if transactions frictions are not negligibly small. The central bank can then implement...