The subject of this paper is to study, thanks to a tax competition model (with tax rates fixation and response of the capital) the ability of local governments to be engaged in tax cooperation when they differ significatively in size. We?ll study cooperative and non ? cooperative choices of...

The first part of this report deals with the evolution of Spanish local governments throughout the non-democratic period (1950-1975) and the beginning and development of the decentralization (1978-1988). In the nineties, local authorities claimed the need to reinforce their local governments by...

Thanks to games theory and within the french institutional framework, the aim of this paper is first to explain why we observe a spontaneous tax competition between local governments with similar size and then to show that « l?intercommunalité » in other words consolidation of...

Fiscal relief of local governments by the central authorities has become a subject of major concern in the political economy of multi-level governments. Generally studied in federations, fiscally irresponsible behaviors are endogenous to the system of financial relations amongst levels of...

This article first presents a general model of public good provision in representative democracies : depending on the elected representative?s bureaucratic power, the level of public expenditures can be a function or not of the income and the tax base of the median voter. Following the approach...