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Inducing Variety : A Theory of Innovation Contests

Letina, Igor - 2019

This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research … suitable contests can induce such variety. The buyer-optimal contest is a bonus tournament, where suppliers can choose only …, we compare the optimal contest to scoring auctions and fixed-prize tournaments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904151

Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers

Betto, Maria; Thomas, Matthew W. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 1, pp. 169-206

applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments, marketing, and R&D races. To understand this influence, we study a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468067

Invader Strategies in the War of Attrition with Private Information

Metzger, Lars - 2013

Second price allpay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if valuations are private information. I show that for any level of uncertainty there exists a pure deviation strategy close to the equilibrium strategy such that for some valuations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083673

Multi-Battle Contests, Finite Automata, and the Tug-of-War

Ewerhart, Christian - 2019

This paper examines multi-battle contests whose extensive form can be represented in terms of a finite state machine …). Degenerate cases are the finite-horizon contests on the one hand (e.g., the match race), and the tug-of-war on the other. Next …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891585

Unique Equilibrium in Contests with Incomplete Information

Ewerhart, Christian - 2018

Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936799

A 'Fractal' Solution to the Chopstick Auction

Ewerhart, Christian - 2017

This paper constructs a novel equilibrium in the chopstick auction of Szentes and Rosenthal (Games and Economic Behavior, 2003a, 2003b). In contrast to the existing solution, the identified equilibrium strategy allows a simple and intuitive characterization. Moreover, its best-response set has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969046

Elastic Contests and the Robustness of the All-Pay Auction

Ewerhart, Christian - 2014

This paper studies a large class of imperfectly discriminating contests, referred to as elastic contests, that induce … definite answers regarding the extent of rent dissipation in Tullock contests with intermediate values of the decisiveness …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054257

A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220157

A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation‐based tâtonnement

Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 943-978

The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806306

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of biddersâ€™ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457