In this paper, I introduce an extension of (TU) games with a coalition structure. Taking a situation where all coalitions are already established is not reasonable in order to forecast the reality; there is not only one possible coalition, there are several. I consider situations where...

Cost allocation problems on networks can be interpreted as cooperative games on a graph structure. In the classical standard tree game, the cost of a service delivered, by a source has to be allocated between homogeneous users at the vertices. But, modern networks have also the capacity to...

A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, diff erent concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield diff erent distributions of worth. Moreover, computational eff...

In an economic or social situation where agents have to group in order to achieve common goals, how can we calculate the coalitional rents of the agents arising from the coalition formation? Once we have formalized the situation via a TU-game and a network describing the economic structure, we...

Cost allocation problems on networks can be interpreted as cooperative games on a graph structure. In the classical standard tree game, the cost of a service delivered, by a source has to be allocated between homogeneous users at the vertices. But, modern networks have also the capacity to...

A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield diff erent distributions of worth. Moreover, computational effort...

In this paper, I introduce an extension of (TU) games with a coalition structure. Taking a situation where all coalitions are already established is not reasonable in order to forecast the reality; there is not only one possible coalition, there are several. I consider situations where...

In an economic or social situation where agents have to group in order to achieve common goals, how can we calculate the coalitional rents of the agents arising from the coalition formation? Once we have formalized the situation via a TU-game and a network describing the economic structure, we...

Communication is well known to increase cooperation rates in social dilemma situations, but the exact mechanisms behind this have been questioned and discussed. This study examines the impact of communication on public good provisioning in an artefactual field experiment conducted with 216...

Rebound effects measure the behaviorally induced offset in the reduction of energy consumption following efficiency improvements. Using both panel estimation and quantile-regression methods on household travel diary data collected in Germany between 1997 and 2009, this study investigates the...