Motivated by recent disasters, this paper analyzes the risk sharing aspect in a federation. The regions can be hit by a shock leading to losses that occur with an exogenous probability and in a stochastically independent way. The regions can spend effort on self-insurance to reduce the size of...

We provide a solution to the free-rider problem in the provision of a public good. To this end we define a biased indirect contribution game which provides the efficient amount of the public good in non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. No confiscatory taxes or other means of coercion are used. We...

Obtaining significant levels of cooperation in public good and environmental games, under the assumption of players being purely selfish, is usually prevented by the problem of freeriding. Coalitions, in fact, generally fail to be internally stable and this cause a serious underprovision of the...

Based on a survey among more than 5,000 German households and a single-binary choice experiment in which we randomly split the respondents into two groups, this paper elicits both households’ willingness to pay (WTP) for power supply security and their willingness to accept (WTA) compensations...

We apply a heterogenous coefficient spatial autoregressive panel model from Aquaro, Bailey and Pesaran (2015) to explore competition/cooperation by Berlin fueling stations in setting prices for diesel and E5 fuel. Unlike the maximum likelihood estimation method set forth by Aquaro, Bailey and...

I provide evidence that fund managers who overweight firms with the most differentiated products ('monopolies') exhibit a superior risk-adjusted performance. This is consistent with information advantages due to a better understanding of qualitative information on a firm's competitive...

Taking a firm's competitive position into account benefits investors who are better at evaluating this qualitative information. I find that fund managers who overweight companies with market power outperform their peers. Placebo exercises and an exogenous shock to product market competition...

Processing qualitative information about a firm's product market competition matters for fund performance. I find that fund managers with a better understanding of a firm's market power exhibit a superior risk-adjusted performance. Managers who overweight companies with the fewest competitors...

Processing qualitative information about a firm's product market competition matters for professional investors. Consistent with a superior understanding of a firm's market power, fund managers who overweight companies with the fewest competitors (monopolies) outperform their peers. An exogenous...