This study investigates the transition from being a listed company with a dispersed ownership structure to being a privately held company with a concentrated ownership structure. We consider a sample of private equity backed portfolio companies to evaluate the consequences of the corporate...

We are able to shed light on the black box of restructuring tools private equity investors use to improve the operational performance of their portfolio companies. By building on previous work considering performance evaluation of PE backed companies, we analyze whether private equity improves...

Private equity fund managers are typically required to invest their own money alongside the fund. We examine how this coinvestment affects the acquisition strategy of leveraged buyout funds. In a simple model, where the investment and capital structure decisions are made simultaneously, we show...

We examine the incentive effects of private equity (PE) professionals' ownership in the funds they manage. In a simple model, we show that managers select less risky firms and use more debt financing the higher their ownership. We test these predictions for a sample of PE funds in Norway, where...

This paper analyzes the influence Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) have on the operating performance of the LBO target companies' direct competitors. A unique and hand-collected data set on LBOs in the United States in the period 1985-2009 allows us to analyze the effects different restructuring...

We investigate the career dynamics of high-tech entrepreneurs by analyzing the exit choice of entrepreneurs: to found another firm, to become dependently employed, or to act as a business angel. Our detailed data resting on the CrunchBase online database indicate that founders stick with...

We investigate the career dynamics of high-tech entrepreneurs by analyzing the exit choice of entrepreneurs: to act as a business angel, to found another firm, or to become dependently employed. Our detailed data from CrunchBase indicate that founders are more likely to stick with...

We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside...

We develop a model that endogenizes the manager's choice of firm risk and of inside debt investment strategy. Our model delivers two predictions. First, managers have an incentive to reduce the correlation between inside debt and company stock in bad times. Second, managers that reduce such a...

We develop a model that endogenizes the manager's choice of firm risk and of deferred compensation investment strategy. Our model delivers two predictions. First, managers have an incentive to reduce the correlation between deferred compensation and company stock in bad times. Second, managers...