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Competitive Careers as a Way to Mediocracy

Kräkel, Matthias - 2009

We show that incompetitive careers based on individual performance the least productive individuals may have the highest probabilities to be promoted to top positions. These individuals have the lowest fall-back positions and, hence, the highest incentives to succeed in career contests. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333803

Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333804

Consumer Loss Aversion and the Intensity of Competition

Karle, Heiko; Peitz, Martin - 2010

Consider a differentiated product market in which all consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the …-point distribution with respect to match value and price that will make them realize gains or losses if their eventually chosen product …-value dimension leads to a less competitive outcome, while loss aversion in the price dimension leads to a more competitive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333807

Unique Equilibrium in Two-Part Tariff Competition between Two-Sided Platforms

Reisinger, Markus - 2010

to price discriminate if per-transaction costs are relatively large. This is the case because two-part tariffs allow … platforms to better distribute these costs among the two sides. Under two-sided single-homing price discrimination hurts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334001

Information acquisition in conflicts

Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334005

Signaling in Auctions among Competitors

von Scarpatetti, Benedikt; Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334084

Information sharing in contests

Kovenock, Dan; Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010

We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or R&D. We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334110

Social Preferences and Competition

Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2009

There is a general presumption that social preferences can be ignored if markets are competitive. Market experiments (Smith 1962) and recent theoretical results (Dufwenberg et al. 2008) suggest that competition forces people to behave as if they were purely self-interested. We qualify this view....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334117