Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes...

We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. It is characterised by its focus on an informational structure which sets free from the strict separation between public information and private information. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken...

Measuring risk aversion is sensitive to assumptions about the wealth in subjects' utility functions. Data from the same subjects in low- and high-stake lottery decisions allow estimating the wealth in a pre-specified one-parameter utility function simultaneously with risk aversion. This paper...

Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterized by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point for higher-order beliefs and affect agents' behaviour...