Showing 1 - 10 of 137
appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333827
to contribute to the team output. We vary the type of information the second mover receives prior to his effort choice …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333885
This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333805
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort … and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334146
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333930
laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant … effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333735
an information item that he is the only player to hold. Players are offered a ?nite number of periods to centralize the … offered an additional reward that he keeps for himself. In this framework where information transmission is strategic and … physically restricted, we provide a necessary and suffcient condition for a group to pool information items in every equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334059
measures, I argue that subjective evaluations might sometimes also be used to withhold information from the worker. I … furthermore argue that withholding information is particularly important under circumstances where the credibility issue is small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334156
This paper shows that it is profitable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain investment strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333715
We analyze the optimal design of rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous workers. Iftournament prizes do not differ between the workers(uniform prizes), as in the previous tournament literature, the outcome will be ineffcient. In the case of limited liability, the employer may benefit from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333787