This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well …. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium … victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Further, sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The effect is most …

Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an … appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze … such doping within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major effects are identified which determine …

talent are substitutes or complements in the underlying contest-success function. However, in case of complements the …

differences in betting odds or rankings to measure ability differences, our results support standard tournament theory as we find …

This paper addresses the selection problem in promotion tournaments. I consider a situation with heterogeneous … employees and ask whether an employer might be interested in repeating a promotion tournament. On the one hand, this yields a …

This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player …, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus … sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex …

In this paper a tournament between teams (a collective tournament) is analyzed, where each contestant may spend … productive effort in order to increase his team's performance or sabotage the members of the opponent team. It is shown that … members does. As a consequence, sabotage activities are only directed at a team's weaker members. This finding is quite …

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale …, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best … performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents …

assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …